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Presidential electors are obligated by custom and, in some states, by
law, to cast their Electoral College votes for the candidate who won their
state's election. An elector who exercises discretion and votes for an
alternative candidate is commonly (if somewhat uncharitably) known as
a "faithless elector."i Until the election of 2016, faithless electors were
rare enough to be little more than a curiosity, albeit one that sparked
academic debate about the Constitution's structure and society's
democratic values. 2 In the thirty years prior to 2016 (including the
* Attorney, 2014-; Federal Judicial Clerk for the Honorable William H. Walls, 20152016; J.D., cum laude, Harvard Law School, 2014; M.A. Stanford University, 2011; B.A. Emory
University, 2008.
1. Although a few commentators with more sympathy to the idea of elector discretion
have used terms like "autonomous elector," see MARTIN DIAMOND, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND
THE AMERICAN IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 6 (1977), or "party-defector elector," see Henry Stokes

Paulsen, The ConstitutionalPower ofthe ElectoralCollege, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Nov. 21, 2016),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/11/18283/ (the "faithless" descriptor is nearly
universal).
2. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan, The Very Faithless Elector, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 123, 124
215
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divisive and contested 2000 election), only two faithless votes were
recorded: John Edwards received a vote earned by John Kerry in 2004,3
and Lloyd Bentsen received a vote earned by Michael Dukakis in 1988.4
In addition to these two votes, Washington, D.C. elector Barbara LettSimmons, who was pledged to Al Gore in 2000, abstained from voting to
protest the District's lack of congressional representation.5 She
characterized this as an act of civil disobedience rather than a faithless
vote and declared that she would have voted for Gore had the ultimate
outcome been in doubt.6 Notably, all three of these modern defections
came from electors pledged to the defeated presidential candidate, so
their faithless votes ran no risk of depriving the winner of his majority.
Indeed, in the 50 years prior to 2016, only one elector pledged to a
winning candidate cast a faithless vote, and that vote occurred after
Richard Nixon's 49-state landslide victory in 1972, when Roger
MacBride of Virginia voted for Libertarian John Hospers instead of
Nixon.7 This single exception occurred after Nixon earned a stunning 521
votes, arguably proving the rule that, in modern America, faithless votes
are occasionally cast as acts of protest but never as serious attempts to
change electoral outcomes. In the context of this history, observers like
Joy McAfee have argued that the fear of faithless electors determining an
election's outcome had "been ignited based upon fortune telling and
speculation" rather than any genuine risk.8 Likewise, Judith Best
dismissed the potential problem presented by faithless electors as being
too "miniscule" to justify a constitutional amendment. 9
But after two election cycles in which no faithless votes were cast,

&

(2001); see Robert Bennett, The Problem ofthe Faithless Elector: Trouble Aplenty Brewing Just
Below the Surface in Choosing the President, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 121, 121 (2006); see also
Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J.L.

POL. 665, 668-69 (1996) (discussing the lack of scholarly consensus as to the status of electors).
3. See Minnesota Elector Gives Edwards a Vote, Kerry Gets Other Nine, MINNESOTA
PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 13, 2004), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2004/12/13_ap

electors/.
4.

L. PAIGE WHITAKER & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30804, THE

ELECTORAL COLLEGE: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS 10 (2001).

5.

See id; see also The 43rd President: The Electors Vote, and the Surprises are Few,

N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2000), http://nyti.ms/2hqiOqy (left ballot blank to protest capital's "colonial
status").
6.

7.

WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4.

Id.

8. Joy McAfee, 2001: Should the College Electors Finally Graduate? The Electoral
College: An American Compromisefrom Its Inception to Election 2000, 32 CuMB. L. REV. 643,

653 (2001).
9.

JUDITH BEST, THE CAST AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 190 (1971).
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seven were recorded in 2016'o-by far the most in more than a century.' 1
An additional three were cast but invalidated by operation of state laws
of uncertain constitutionality.1 2 And three more electors filed lawsuits
against state officials before the vote, unsuccessfully seeking injunctive
relief against state laws that prevented them from casting a faithless
vote.13
Significantly, several of these faithless votes were not merely
symbolic acts of protest but were part of a coordinated, if ultimately
unsuccessful, attempt to keep the Presidency out of the hands of Donald
Trump.1 4 Electors from both parties publicly called for their fellow
electors to defect to a mutually agreeable candidate." While this effort
was ongoing, multiple Democratic elected officials urged that the
Electoral College vote be postponed, implying that electors might change
their minds and exercise discretion as evidence of alleged Russian
intelligence operations targeting the Clinton campaign became public.16
As a result, a large-scale public campaign urging electors to defect sprang
up in advance of the vote.17
In the end, thirteen electors attempted to cast faithless votes or
participated in lawsuits premised on their intention to do so. 18 This break
with precedent was a rare test of the patchwork of state laws that attempt
to regulate the electors. Disturbingly, this test revealed that the process
by which some faithless votes are invalidated and some are not is even
more inconsistent and incoherent than scholars have imagined.1 9 We are
left after the election of 2016 with new uncertainty as to the constitutional
framework for selecting a president, even as the public demonstrates
more openness to the idea of faithless electors than it had in the past. It is
sobering to note that George W. Bush achieved the Presidency in 2000
by winning 272 electoral votes, just two more than the required threshold
of 270. The number of faithless votes cast in 2016 easily exceeds Bush's
margin of victory in 2000.
10. See Julia Boccagno, Which Candidatesdid the Seven "Faithless"Electors Support?,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/which-candidates-did-the-sevenfaithless-electors-support-election-201 6.
11. WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4.
12. See Scott Detrow, Donald Trump Secures Electoral College Win, With Few Surprises,

NPR (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/12/19/506188169/donald-trump-poised-to-secur
e-electoral-college-win-with-few-surprises.

13. Koller v. Brown, No. 5:16-cv-7069-EJD, 2016 WL 7325032 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16,2016);
Baca v. Hickenlooper, 16-cv-2986-WYD-NYW, 2016 WL 7384286 (D. Col. Dec. 21, 2016).
discussion infra Part II.
discussion infra Part Ill.
discussion infra Part 111.
discussion infra Part 111.
discussion infra Part III.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See
See
See
See
See

19.

See discussion infra Parts II, IV.

UNIVERSI7 OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF IAW & PUBLIC POLICY

218

[Vol. 28

This Article will begin by discussing the constitutional framework
that sets up the Electoral College and the evolution of federal law on the
electoral system. It will then survey the various types of state laws that
currently "bind" electors to vote for the winning candidate, arguing that
these laws should be classified into two broad categories--one of which
creates more uncertainty than the other. This paper will then review the
events leading up to the 2016 Electoral College vote, including lawsuits
filed by would-be faithless electors in California, Colorado, and
Washington. The next section will discuss how the conventional
understanding of faithless electors should be revised after the events of
2016. In the final section, I argue that there is more uncertainty as to the
operation of the various state "binding" laws than past observers have
realized, because many such laws leave wide discretion as to their
operation in the hands of partisan state election officials. In light of this,
I conclude the article by urging state legislatures and the courts to
minimize these dangers by working toward a uniform and coherent
electoral system. Such a system is more needed now than ever before.

I. THE FAITHLESS ELECTOR BEFORE 2016: A CONSTITUTIONAL
OMISSION AND AN ACADEMIC CURIOSITY

The Constitution was designed to leave "the selection of the President
to the people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere." 20
Article II, Section 1 provides that:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding
an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be
appointed an Elector.
At the time of ratification, Alexander Hamilton argued in favor of the
Electoral College in Federalist 68, articulating a view that active electors
would stand as a bulwark against the possibility that a president with
"talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity" 21 could achieve
office without the necessary qualifications or the appropriate
temperament. Hamilton believed that a "small number of persons,
selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most
20.

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).

21.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY, JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 68, 354,

(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Gideon ed. 2001). Whether skill with 140-character
tweets should be considered as one of the "little arts of popularity" is a subject for another time.
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likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such
complicated investigations" as would be required to select a president.2 2
This process would afford "a moral certainty, that the office of President
will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree
endowed with the requisite qualifications." 23 Although there are many
interpretations as to why the framers ultimately chose to adopt the
Electoral College system rather than direct national elections, 24 few
dispute that electors were originally intended to have discretion in casting
their votes. 25
But, as Robert Bennett noted, "it is astounding how quickly many of
the assumptions on which [the original design of the Electoral College]
was based proved to be false." 26 After the Constitution's framework was
put into effect, it soon became evident that the process of selecting the
winner of the Electoral College vote as President and the runner-up as
Vice President was flawed.2 7 The Twelfth Amendment reformed the
Electoral College system to correct this flaw. In relevant part, it mandates
that:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot
for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not
be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name
in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct
ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make
distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and all persons
22. Id. at 352.
23. Id. at 354.
24. E.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 377 (1963) (The "Electoral College was set up as
a compromise to enable the formation of the Union among the several sovereign states."); Akhil
Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral College: Past, Present, and Future, 33 OHIo N.U.
L. REv. 467, 467-71 (2007) (arguing that the lobbying of slave-owners was "the real demon
dooming direct national election in 1787 and 1803"); McAfee, supra note 8, at 646 (The

"Electoral College was actually a compromise based upon federalism and equality of all states.").
25. "No one faithful to our history can deny that the plan originally contemplated what is
implicit in its text-that electors would be free agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan
judgment as to the men best qualified for the Nation's highest offices." Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S.

214, 232 (1952) (Jackson, J. dissenting); see, e.g., Ross & Josephson, supra note 2, at 676; Akhil
Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution'sSecession Gap,
48 ARK. L. REv. 215, 230 (1995) (The "Constitution plainly contemplates that, at least formally,
the electors must themselves decide upon their votes."). See also Bennett, supra note 2, at 126.
26. See also Bennett, supra note 2, at 127.
27. See, e.g., 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1824 (1797); 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1289-90 (1802); see
generally Tadahisa Kuroda, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at 1-20 (1994); see also Blair, 343 U.S. at 224,
n. I1 ("During the John Adams administration, we had a President and Vice-President of different
parties, a situation which did not commend itself either to the Nation or to most political theorists.

The situation was manifestly intolerable.").
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voted for as Vice-President and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the
seat of the government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate.
The Twelfth Amendment was not intended to remove elector
discretion, as can be seen from the statements of the Amendment's
contemporaries. For example, William Loughton Smith, Representative
from South Carolina and one of the first to propose the Electoral
College's reform, believed that the problem with the original system for
choosing a Vice President was that it did not "carry into effect the real
intention of the Electors." 28
By the late 1820s, "almost all of the states then in the Union had ...
made the shift to having eligible citizens within each state choose the
entire slate of electors, presumably based on their positions and the
candidates they supported." 29 In the decades to come, a consensus formed
around the idea that the electors should vote in accordance with the
wishes of the voters of their state. 3 0 This evolution was not hotly
contested; it took seventy years for the Supreme Court to first address the
issue of state control over electors. In McPherson v. Blacker, plaintiffs
challenged a scheme by Michigan to allocate its electoral votes by
congressional district, and the Court held that the Constitution "has
conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the
appointment of electors." 3 1
In the coming decades, two state courts would address electoral
discretion as well. In 1912, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
electors applying their own judgment in the Hamiltonian model would
deprive the state's citizens of their right to vote.3 2 In 1933, the Supreme
Court of New York held that the role of electors is "purely ministerial."3 3
Of course, only the U.S. Supreme Court could definitively interpret the
Constitution, but these state court decisions demonstrate society's
evolving understanding of the role of electors at the turn of the twentieth

28. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1824 (1797).
29. John A. Zadrozny, The Myth ofDiscretion: Why PresidentialElectors Do not Receive
FirstAmendment Protection" II COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 165, 167 (2003).

30. By the election of 1872, electors pledged to Horace Greeley voted for him "even
though, by the time of the Electoral College vote, Greeley was dead and in his coffin." Ronald D.
Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 201, 204 (1996).

31. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104
(2000) ("[T]he state legislature's power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary
32.
1912).
33.

State ex rel. Neb. Republican State Cent. Comm. v. Wait, 138 N.W. 159, 165 (Neb.
Thomas v. Cohen, 262 N.Y.S. 320, 326 (Sup. Ct 1933).
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century. 3 4
A more significant challenge to the system came in the middle of the
Twentieth Century, as the nation began to grapple with segregation and,
as a result, southern Democrats began to chafe against their party.
President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in July 1948,
ordering the desegregation of the U.S. military. 35 In the following
election, a faithless vote was cast against him when Preston Parks of
Tennessee voted for Strom Thurmond of the State's Rights Party rather
than Truman. 3 6 And in the next election, Alabama Democrat Edmund
Blair sought a seat as elector but refused to pledge to vote for the ultimate
Democratic nominee, as required by party rule (and by a state statute
requiring party primary candidates to abide by party rules).37 Instead,
Blair brought a challenge to this Alabama law that gave party officials
the authority to set qualifications of primary candidates for the position
of elector. 3 Blair alleged that this Alabama law violated the Twelfth
Amendment by "restrict[ing] the freedom of a federal elector to vote in
the Electoral College for his choice . . . ."39 The case he brought,
captioned Ray v. Blair, reached the U.S. Supreme Court after the
Supreme Court of Alabama issued a writ of mandamus, siding with
Blair.4 0
In an opinion by Justice Reed, the Court recognized a fundamental
paradox of the Electoral College: that "presidential electors exercise a
federal function in balloting for President and Vice-President, but they
are not federal officers or agents any more than the state elector who votes
for congressmen. They act by authority of the state that in turn receives
its authority from the federal constitution." 4' The Court also
34.

Id. The New York court stated that:
To read [the Constitution] with an eye to the language only and with a disregard
for the brilliant history of party government in this nation, which has been
attended with such signal success (placing us first among the nations of the
world), would mean to hold that our primaries, nominating, campaigning, and
voting, are empty gestures.

Writing decades after Watergate and soon after the anti-establishment surge of 2016, it is difficult
to imagine a court today echoing Cohen's uncritical and wholly laudatory embrace of the history
of party government in the United States. Cohen and Wait are both products of a time when public
faith in party institutions was far higher than today.

35.

Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948).

36.
37.

WITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4, at 12.
Zadrozny, supra note 29, at 178.

38.
39.
40.

Id.
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 215 (1952).
Id at 215-16.

41.

Id. at 224-25. For an argument that this holding was mistaken, see Kesavan, supra note

2, at 131-32 (arguing that the finding in Blair, that electors are not federal officials, is incorrect).
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acknowledged that the "applicable constitutional provisions on their face
furnish no definite answer to the query whether a state may permit a party
to require party regularity from its primary candidates for national
electors." 42
But the Court avoided making a decision that might have clarified
whether elector discretion is required by the Twelfth Amendment or can
be regulated by the states. Instead, it framed the issues narrowly, relying
on the fact that "the right to a place on the primary ballot only is in
contest." 4 3 Because the Alabama law in question only affected voluntary
participants in a party primary, who were theoretically free to run for the
office of elector as independent candidate candidates (and thereby avoid
the law's restrictions), the Court held that the law did not violate the
Twelfth Amendment. 4 It explained that:
[E]ven if such promises by candidates for the electoral college are
legally unenforceable because violative of an assumed
constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, Art.
II §1, to vote as he may choose in the electoral college, it would
not follow that the requirement of a pledge in the primary is
unconstitutional.4 5
This avoidance worked as a matter of formal logic, but it ignored the
fact that running for presidential elector outside of a party system is
effectively impossible in modem America. This objection animated
Justice Jackson's lively dissent in Blair, as Jackson understood that
"long-prevailing conditions .. . effectively foreclose[] any chance of the
State's being represented by an unpledged elector." 46 Within the party
system, Jackson noted that the electors, "although often personally
eminent, independent, and respectable, [had] officially [become]
voluntary party lackeys and intellectual nonentities . . . ."4' But the party
system had become so ubiquitous that, as "an institution, the Electoral
College [had] suffered atrophy almost indistinguishable from rigor
mortis."48

Jackson argued that, under the original constitutional plan, "no state
law could control the elector in the performance of his federal duty, any
more than it could a United States Senator who also is chosen by, and

42.
43.
44.

Blair, 343 U.S. at 224.
Id. at 223 n.10.
Id. at 230-31.

45.

Id. at 230 (emphasis added); see also id. at 223 n.10.

46.
47.
48.

Id. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 232.
Id.
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represents, the State." 49 Jackson presciently believed that the Electoral
College was, at best, "a mystifying and distorting factor in presidential
elections which may resolve a popular defeat into an electoral victory"
and, at worst, "open to local corruption and manipulation, once so
flagrant as to threaten the stability of the country."50 But he also believed
that binding laws like Alabama's turned a "voluntary general practice"
into a "legal obligation," and he strongly objected to the idea that "powers
or discretions granted to federal officials by the Federal Constitution can
be forfeited by the Court for disuse."51
Putting aside the merits of the Electoral College itself, Jackson's
dissent reflected a more clear-eyed analysis than the implausible
distinction between primary and general election access relied on by
Reed. Many years later, even scholars who largely approved of the
outcome of Blairhave framed the decision in Jackson's terms rather than
Reed's. 52
But the Blair majority was influential in at least two ways. First,
because it had allowed Alabama's regulatory scheme to survive, an
expanding number of states would pass their own elector binding laws in
the years to come. Second, the fact that the Blair court declined to
definitively interpret the Twelfth Amendment meant that state legislators
had little guidance in drafting these statutes. As a result of this lingering
uncertainty, today's binding statutes vary greatly in their structure and
operation. And while these varying statutes were enacted, commenters
continued to debate whether Blairimplied that they were constitutional.5 3
John Zadrozny performed a survey of the state binding laws that
existed in 2003.54 He classified these statutes into three categories: (1)
states with "a simple statutory declaration that electors will adhere to the
general election results," (2) states that, "anticipating the problems that
would arise from the [first category's] seeming lack of enforceability,
49. Id.
50. Id. at 234.
51. Id. at 233.
52. See Rotunda, supra note 30, at 206 (citing Blair as demonstrating that the states and
political parties had "in effect . . . amended [the Constitution] without enacting a formal
amendment that requires electors to be faithful to their pledge."); see also Zadrozny, supra note
29 (arguing that electors "through an evolutionary process that derives support from the text of
the Constitution, have been rendered mere tools of the state.").
53. For instance, Akhil Amar wrote that, "[c]ontrary to the loose language in that passing
footnote, I now do not think that Ray 'strongly suggests that states can bind collegians any way
they choose."' Amar, supra note 25. On the other hand, Ross and Josephson argued that the
Court's "language and reasoning in Ray v. Blair strongly imply that state laws directly binding
electors to a specific candidate are constitutional." Ross & Josephson, supra note 2, at 665.
Kesavan, meanwhile, simply concluded that it "is still an open question whether this 'seemingly
democratic process' passes constitutional muster." Kesavan, supra note 2, at 125.
54. Zadrozny, supra note 29, at 179.

224
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implemented statutes that required electors to honor pledges made to their
respective parties," and (3) states in which "the casting of a faithless vote
triggered an automatic resignation on the part of that faithless elector and
a subsequent appointment of a new elector who would honor the
obligation."
I suggest that a dichotomy between deterrent and invalidation statutes
is a more precise framework than Zadronzy's three classes. To be sure,
among deterrent-based statutes, some merely provide a "statutory
declaration" that electors vote for the nominee of their political party
whereas others require electors to take an oath to vote for the winning
candidate 57 and still others criminalize a faithless vote and require the
state attorney general to bring a criminal action against faithless
electors. 8 But, for three reasons, these categories collapse into each other
on closer inspection.
First, some states that seemingly only have a "statutory declaration"
against faithless votes also have criminal statutes that could be applied to
a faithless elector if a state attorney general chose to vigorously pursue
such a case. For example, California Elections Code § 6906 declares that
the state's "electors, when convened, if both candidates are alive, shall
vote by ballot for that person for President and that person for Vice
President ... who are, respectively, the candidates of the political party
which they represent. . . ." But California Elections Code § 18002 states

that: "Every person charged with the performance of any duty under any
law of this state relating to elections, who willfully neglects or refuses to
perform it ... [is] punishable by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars
or by imprisonment ... for 16 months. . . ." Thus, whether California is
a "statutory declaration" state or a state that "require[s] electors to honor
pledges" depends on whether a prosecutor decided to apply § 18002 to a
faithless elector.
Second, many states require electors to certify that they will vote for
the winning candidate. Alabama, for example, specifically requires an
Elector to certify that he or she will: "cast my ballot as . .. elector for
for President and
for Vice-President of the United States'

(inserting in said blank spaces the respective names of the persons named
as nominees for said respective offices in the certificate to which this
statement is attached)." 5 9 Such a pledge could operate, like a "statutory
declaration," as a social and normative deterrent against faithless electors
who feel personal pressure to follow state law and avoid breaking their
oath. But alternatively, in the hands of an aggressive state attorney
55.
56.
57.

Id
E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 14-28 (1981).
E.g., ALA. CODE § 17-14-31 (2006).

58.

E.g., S.C. CODE ANN.

59.

See ALA. CODE

§ 7-19-80 (1971).

§ 17-14-31 (2006).
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general, such a pledge could operate much like a statute that criminalizes
a faithless vote by laying the grounds for a perjury charge against a
faithless elector.
The final reason the deterrent-based statutes belong in a single
category is that even those statutes that, on first glance, appear to set up
specific statutory penalties against faithless electors actually rely on the
same social and customary deterrence as the "statutory declaration"
states. For example, Washington State law provides for a $1,000 fine for
the casting of a faithless vote. But an elector who does not feel bound by
social pressure to abide by state law is unlikely to be convinced by the
deterrent effect of a $1,000 fine. The Electoral College of 2016 provided
evidence that committed faithless electors will violate state laws that have
specific statutory penalties just as they will violate state laws that do
not.6 0 For these reasons, the state binding laws essentially fall into two
categories.
The majority of states with elector binding laws rely on deterrencebased statutory schemes. In this category are Alabama,'' Alaska,62
Delaware,6 6 the District of
California,6 3 Colorado,6 4 Connecticut,
Columbia, 67 Florida,6' Hawaii, 6 9 Maine,7 0 Massachusetts,7 1 Maryland, 72
Mississippi, 73 Montana,7 4 Ohio,7 Oregon,7 6 Tennessee," Vermont,7 8
Virginia, 9 Wisconsin,80 and Wyoming. 8 ' In a subcategory of these laws
are states that specifically provide a penalty for a faithless vote. In New

60.
61.

See discussion infra Part H.B.3.
See ALA. CODE § 17-14-31 (2006).

62.

See ALASKA STAT.

63.

See CAL. ELEC. CODE

64.

See COLO. REV. STAT.

65.

CONN. GEN. STAT.

66.

DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 15,

67.
68.
69.

D.C. Code § 1-1001.08(g) (2015).
FLA. STAT. § 103.021 (2011).
HAw. REV. STAT. § 14-28 (1981).

§

15.30.040 (1960).

§ 6906 (1994).
§ 1-4-304

(2001).

§ 9-176 (1961).
§ 4303

(1992).

70. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 805 (1989). Maine law provides that at-large electors vote
for the winner of the state's popular vote and that electors representing a congressional district
cast their vote for the winner of each district.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 8 (1990).
MD. CODE, ELEC. LAW, § 8-505 (2007).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-785 (2010).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-25-304 (2011).
OmIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.40 (1969).
OR. REV. STAT. § 248.355 (2001).

77.
78.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-15-104(c) (1972).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2732 (1980).

79.

VA. CODE ANN.

80.
81.

Wis. STAT. § 7.75 (1979).
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 22-19-108 (1977).

§ 24.2-203 (2001).
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Mexico, a faithless vote is a fourth degree felony. 8 2 In Washington, a
faithless elector "is subject to a civil penalty of up to one thousand
dollars." 83 South Carolina gives "any registered elector the right to
institute proper action to require compliance" with state election law. 8 4
South Carolina also establishes that a faithless vote is a violation of state
election law and requires that the state Attorney General bring a criminal
action against a faithless elector. 85
The second category of binding law is the invalidation-based binding
law, which provides for the automatic removal and replacement of any
elector who attempts to cast a faithless vote. One state with such a law is
Michigan.8 6 Under Michigan law,
[r]efusal or failure to vote for the candidates for president and vicepresident appearing on the Michigan ballot of the political party
which nominated the elector constitutes a resignation from the
office of elector, his vote shall not be recorded and the remaining
electors shall forthwith fill the vacancy.8 7
Other states with this type of statute are Nebraska,8" Nevada, 89 North
Carolina (which also provides for a $500 fine for the attempt to cast a
faithless vote), 90 Oklahoma (which also provides that an attempt to cast a
faithless vote is a misdemeanor subject to a $1,000 fine), 9 1 and Utah. 9 2
Interestingly, some of these statutes leave small windows for the
exercise of elector discretion. Several allow electors to exercise discretion
in the case of the death of a candidate between the Election and the
College vote, giving their electors more discretion than Horace Greeley's
electors appear to have believed they had in 1872.93 Two states go farther.
Utah creates an exception to its binding law "in the cases of death or
felony conviction of a candidate." 9 4 And South Carolina has created an
exception under which the:

82.
83.
84.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-9 (1978).
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.340 (2003).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-80 (1976).

85.

Id

86.

See MICH. COMP. LAWS

§

168.47 (1970); see also Gelineau v. Johnson, 904 F. Supp.

2d 742 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (discussing Michigan's binding law).
87. MICH. Comp. LAWS § 168.47 (1970).
88. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714 (2014). Like Maine, Nebraska also provides for Electoral
voting by Congressional district.
89. NEV. STAT. § 298.075 (2013).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-212 (1998).
91. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 10-102 (2013), § 10-109 (1975).
92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-13-304 (1995).
93. Wis. STAT. § 7.75 (1979); see Rotunda, supra note 30.
94. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-13-304 (1995).
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executive committee of the party from which an elector of the
electoral college was elected may relieve the elector from the
obligation to vote for a specific candidate when, in its judgment,
circumstances shall have arisen which, in the opinion of the
committee, it would not be in the best interest of the State for the
elector to cast his ballot for such a candidate. 9 5
In this way, these statutes arguably represent a middle ground between
a true binding law and elector discretion.
Although today's binding statutes can be placed into two broad
categories, many nonetheless contain a surprising amount of ambiguity.
One such statute is Colorado's, which will be discussed in further detail
below. Colorado appears to have a "deterrent-based" declaratory scheme
in that Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-4-204(5) mandates that "[e]ach presidential
elector shall vote for the presidential candidate and, by separate ballot,
vice-presidential candidate who received the highest number of votes at
the preceding general election in this state." Unlike Michigan, Colorado
does not formally create a vacancy upon "refusal or failure to vote" for
the correct candidates. Unlike South Carolina, Colorado does not
criminalize a faithless vote. Unlike Alabama, Colorado does not require
electors to make a specific pledge with statutorily mandated text that
requires them to vote for the winning candidate.
But Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-4-204(1) requires that the electors must "take
the oath required by law for presidential electors" and it also provides that
"[i]f any vacancy occurs in the office of a presidential elector because of
death, refusal to act, absence, or other cause, the presidential electors
present shall immediately proceed to fill the vacancy in the electoral
college." Could a Colorado election official require an elector to pledge
to vote for the winning candidate as part of their oath of office? Could
such an election official interpret an intention to cast a faithless vote as a
"refusal to act" or "other cause," leading to an elector's replacement?
What recourse would a would-be faithless elector have if an election
official chose to do so?
The ambiguity created by such statutes interjects partisan state
election officials into the process, as these actors have significant
discretion in deciding whether faithless votes are successfully cast. 9 6 For
this reason, invalidation-based statutes more effectively serve the goal of
enacting the will of the voters of the states in which they are passed, as
they do not create uncertainty by leaving discretion to state officials. In a
close and contested election, this discretion can create yet another
unneeded layer of constitutional uncertainty in an already complex and
95.
96.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-80 (1976).
See discussion infra Part III.
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contested process.
II. DISRUPTION: THE ELECTION OF 2016

A. A Growing Movement for Elector Discretion
On December 5, 2016, after a divisive election that was unprecedented
in many ways, Texas Republican Presidential Elector Christopher Suprun
announced in an editorial column that he would not be voting for Donald
Trump, who had won the state of Texas. 97 Suprun argued that "electors
have the legal right and a constitutional duty to vote their conscience,"
urging his fellow electors to "unify behind a Republican alternative, [such
as] an honorable and qualified man or woman [like] Gov. John Kasich of
Ohio." 9 8 Only once in the past fifty years had an elector pledged to a
winning candidate cast a faithless vote, and then only when the winning
candidate had won an insurmountable victory that was unprecedented in
scale. Suprun was not declaring an intention to cast a protest vote to bring
attention to a cause like statehood for D.C. or libertarianism-he was
urging the Electoral College to intervene in the election's result for the
first time in modern history.
Suprun's call was mirrored by Washington State's Democratic Elector
Bret Chiafalo and Colorado's Democratic Elector Michael Baca. 99
Chiafalo and Baca began a group they referred to as the "Hamilton
Electors," a reference to Federalist 68.100 Chiafalo argued that the group
was "trying to be the 'break in case of emergency' fire hose that's gotten
dusty over the last 200 years.. . This is an emergency."' 0 ' They suggested
that Democratic and Republican electors both defect to a Republican
"compromise candidate" such as John Kasich or Mitt Romney.l 2
Although many had assumed that, as Ronald Rotunda wrote, it had
"long been clear that people expect the electors to act as their agents, not
as independent decision makers," 0 3 Suprun's and Chiafalo's call
generated significant public support among those opposed to Donald
Trump. Individual electors reported receiving tens of thousands of letters

97.

Christopher Suprun, Why I Will Not Cast My Electoral Vote for Donald Trump, N.Y.

TIMES (Dec 5, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2h8jSOv.

98. Id.
99. Lilly O'Donnell, Meet the 'Hamilton Electors'Hopingforan ElectoralCollege Revolt,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/l 1/meet-thehamilton-electors-hoping-for-an-electoral-college-revolt/508433/.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Rotunda, supra note 30, at 204; see also Bennett, supra note 2, at 125.
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and emails urging them to abandon the Republican businessman. 104 The
volume was such that Idaho's Secretary of State released a statement,
declaring that: "In recent days, Idaho's four Republican Party electors
have been receiving phone calls regarding their vote in the Electoral
College .

. .

. Many of these phone calls are crossing into what could

reasonably be considered harassment."' 0 Pennsylvania assigned a
plainclothes state trooper to each of its twenty electors to provide
protection from perceived threats.1 06
These would-be faithless electors also received a certain amount of
support from Democratic elected officials. As allegations emerged that
Russian hacking operations against the Democratic National Committee
(DNC) and Hillary Clinton campaign chair John Podesta had played a
role in the election,10 7 Representative Don Beyer of Virginia called on
Congress to "delay the date of the vote for the Electoral College until an
intelligence briefimg has been given to each Elector." 08 Beyer stated that
"[e]lectors should be given all information relevant to [alleged Russian]
interference before they make their decisions and before they cast their
votes," implicitly taking the position that electors should have discretion
in casting their votes. Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid also called for
presidential electors to be given intelligence briefings as to Russian
activities. 09
As the movement for an Electoral College rebellion against Donald
Trump gathered attention and support, Colorado elector Robert
Nemanich contacted Colorado's Secretary of State Wayne Williams,
104. See, e.g., Joe Ferguson, Arizona Electoral Voters Floodedwith Pleas, Threats Not to
Vote for Trump, ARIZONA DAILY STAR (Dec. 16, 2016), http://tucson.com/news/local/arizona-

electoral-voters-flooded-with-pleas-threats-not-tovote/article_64c49156-6525-5165-84d5-ff55ae
523725.html; Detrow, supra note 12.
105. Press Release, Office of Lawrence Denney, Secretary of State of Idaho, "Idaho's

Presidential Electors Deserve Our Respect and Civility" (Nov. 14, 2016).
106. Angela Couloumbis, Pa. Electors Get Police Protection: "This is Stupid," PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.post-gazette.com/early-returns/2016/12/17/Pennsyl
vania-electors-get-police-protection/stories/201 612170147.
107.

See generally OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING

RussiAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS (ICA 2017-01 D) (Jan. 6, 2017).
108. Patricia Sullivan, Virginia Congressman Callsfor Delay in Electoral College Vote,
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-

congressman-calls-for-delay-in-electoral-college-vote/2016/12/14/98022426-c21 b-I 1e6-8422-e
ac6l cOefl4dstory.html?utmterm=.cO4533c91 e33.
109. Id. The calls by Beyer and Reid echoed one of Hamilton's concerns in Federalist No.
68. Hamilton warned against "the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our
councils." He argued that the Electoral College guarded against this because "the appointment of
the President [did not] depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with
beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate
act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole
purpose of making the appointment."
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asking what would happen if he did not vote for Hillary Clinton and Tim
Kaine, who had won that state." 0 Williams responded that, under
Colorado's binding law, Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-4-304, his office "would
likely remove the elector and seat a replacement elector until all nine
electoral votes were cast for the winning candidates."" Williams then
"instituted a new oath to be given to Colorado's Electors" on the day of
the Electoral College vote and stated that an elector who violated the
statute could face either a misdemeanor or felony perjury charge.11 2 in
response, Nemanich and his fellow Colorado elector Polly Bacall 3
brought an action against Williams, along with Colorado Governor John
Hickenlooper and Colorado Attorney General Cynthia Coffman arguing
that Colorado's binding law violated Article II of the Constitution, as
amended by the Twelfth Amendment, and also compelled speech in
violation of the First Amendment.1 4 Trump and the Trump campaign
intervened in the lawsuit on December 12, 2016."'
Around the same time, California elector Vincenz Koller, pledged to
Hillary Clinton, filed suit in the Northern District of California against
Governor Jerry Brown in his official capacity, seeking to invalidate
California's binding law." 6 Koller declared that he believed he had the
duty to "vote in the best interests of the state and the nation" by selecting
a "qualified compromise candidate" such as Mitt Romney or John
Kasich."' Finally, the initiator of the "Hamilton Electors" movement,
Bret Chiafalo, filed a similar suit in the Western District of Washington
along with his fellow Washington elector, Levi Guerra. 18 These suits
were the most significant legal challenge to elector-binding laws since
Ray v. Blair.
B. A Wave ofLitigation and Three Chances to Revisit Ray v. Blair
1. Baca v. Hickenlooper
After filing in the District of Colorado on December 6, 2016, the Baca
plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction, restraining them from "removing or replacing [them] as
electors, compelling them to vote for certain candidates, precluding them
from voting for any candidates, or otherwise interfering with the vote of
110.

Baca v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-1482, slip op. at 3 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016).

1I1l.
112.

Id. at 4.
Id.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Not to be confused with her fellow 2016 Colorado elector Michael Baca.
Id.
Baca v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-cv-2986, slip op. at I (D. Colo. Dec. 21, 2016).
Koller v. Brown, No. 16-cv-7069, 2016 WL 7325032, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2012).
Id.
Chiafalo v. Inslee, No. 16-36034, 2016 WL 7243752, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2016).
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the electors on December 19, 2016."ll 9 Judge Wiley Daniel denied this
motion, and plaintiffs appealed his decision to the Tenth Circuit.1 2 0
Their appeal was heard by a panel of Judges Mary Beck Briscoe,
Carolyn McHugh, and Nancy Mortiz. In an order for the court, the judges
rejected plaintiffs' argument, noting that they had not pointed to "a single
word in any of these positions that support their position that the
Constitution requires that electors be allowed to exercise their discretion
in choosing who to cast votes for." 12 1 Instead, plaintiffs had primarily
relied on Federalist 68.122 The court explained in a footnote that, although
"we turn to external sources when unable to discern the meaning of the
Constitution from its plain language, we begin our analysis with careful
examination of the words used. Here, plaintiffs make no textual argument
at all." 1 23

Like the Blair Court, the Tenth Circuit did not take a position on
whether elector freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution. It specifically
noted that "there is language in the Twelfth Amendment that could
arguably support the plaintiffs' position," citing an article by Michael
Stokes Paulsen.1 24 But the court declared that it would not make those
arguments in place of plaintiffs, who had failed to make them. 12 5 As an
alternative argument, plaintiffs asserted that requiring them to vote for an
elector was an improper "qualification," but the Tenth Circuit held that
"a statutory requirement to vote in a certain way .. . is more in the way
of a duty than a qualification" and was not inappropriate.1 2 6
Perhaps most significantly, plaintiffs also asserted that the Colorado
statute "violates the Supremacy Clause by usurping Congress's exclusive
power to count electoral votes." 1 27 Specifically, they contended that the
119.

Baca v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-1482, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016).

120.

Id at 5.

121.
122.

Id at 10.
Id. at 10 n.2.

123. Id. Of course, the Supreme Court had already held that "applicable constitutional
provisions, on their face, furnish no definite answer to the query whether a state may permit a
party to require party regularity from its primary candidates for national electors," see Ray v.

Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 (1952), and, as the Baca court itself noted, it is appropriate to look to
external sources where the constitutional text is facially ambiguous.

124.

Baca, No. 16-1482, slip op. Id. at 10 n.3. Paulsen argued that state binding laws are

unconstitutional. Paulsen, supranote 1. Paulsen argued that the text of the Constitution gave states

the power to prescribe the "Manner" in which electors are appointed, which might justify
requiring electors to pledge to vote in a certain way. Id. But, as Paulsen argues, once the electors

are appointed, the text of the Twelfth Amendment refers to "The Electors" meeting in their
respective states and voting by ballot. Id He reads Blair as allowing the state to require electors
to make a pledge but as leaving open the question of whether such a pledge could actually be
enforced. Id.
125. Id.
126.

Id. at 11.

127.

Id
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statute gave Colorado the authority to discount or ignore an elector's vote
if that vote was faithless. The court avoided this issue. 128 It explained that
Williams's threat to remove the electors was not based on the challenged
statute, 1-4-304(5) but was based "upon his interpretation of the authority
afforded to him under Colo. Rev. Stat 1-4-304(1)," which gave the state
the authority to "fill [any] vacanc[ies] in the electoral college" prior to
the start of voting. 129 The court declared that whether 304(1) "also affords
the State with authority to remove an elector after voting has begun is not
a question that has been posed by plaintiffs to either the district court or
this court." 1 30 Surprisingly, the circuit then added a footnote, stating:
"[a]nd we deem such an attempt by the State unlikely in light of the text
of the Twelfth Amendment."' 3 1 Later, in explaining why there was
insufficient risk of irreparable harm to justify extraordinary relief, the
court again noted that "we question whether [304(1)] provides [Williams]
any such authority after voting has commenced, [but] that precise
question is not before us."1 32
I describe the court's footnote as surprising because this is exactly
what Williams did, the text of the Twelfth Amendment notwithstanding.
Furthermore, the removal and replacement of faithless electors after they
have cast their votes is precisely the outcome expressly called for by state
statutes in several other states. Was the Tenth Circuit implying that the
invalidation-based binding laws of states like Michigan violate the text
of the Twelfth Amendment? It would seem so, but the court's dismissal
of this argument was cursory and, its analysis leaves little room for
further extrapolation.
Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs' First Amendment claim that the
Colorado statute burdened their "core political speech." The Court held
that plaintiffs had failed "to identify any authority establishing, or even
remotely suggesting, that the First Amendment applies to electors."l 33
After the Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' appeal, the district court
issued a written opinion along with its order denying injunctive relief.1 34
Judge Daniel took a strong position against elector discretion. He wrote
that plaintiffs were, "in effect, ask[ing] the Court to value their vote over
that of the citizens of Colorado." 3 5 He found that "the citizens of
Colorado would be irreparably harmed if an injunction is granted because
they expect electors to vote for the candidate who won the majority of the
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. n.4.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12-13.
Baca v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-cv-2986, slip op. at I (D. Colo. Dec. 21, 2016).
Id. at 9.
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state's vote."l 3 6 Daniel held that the "public has some expectation, and it
is a permissible expectation, that presidential electors are bound by the
promises they voluntarily made when they accepted their
nominations."l 37

Daniel's opinion arguably took a stronger line against elector
discretion than the circuit did, and he cited no data or authority to support
his conclusion about the public's expectations. 138 Of the three electorbinding challenges brought in 2016, Daniel's decision embraced the right
of states to limit elector discretion most strongly, harkening back in some
ways to the early Twentieth Century state supreme court decisions that
described the role of electors as "purely ministerial."1 39
2. Koller v. Brown
Like Baca, California elector Vincenz Koller sought a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction against California's
Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of State. Koller argued before
Judge Edward Davila that, if he voted for a compromise candidate like
Kasich or Romney, he could face "punitive sanctions" under the
California Elections Code.1 4 0
The California court read Ray v. Blair as providing "some indication
that the Court may not find the California statutes constitutionally
troubling," but it found that the plaintiff met the threshold requirement of
showing "serious questions going to the merits of the claims."l41
Ultimately, however, it denied the plaintiff's request, holding that he had
not sufficiently shown a risk of irreparable harm to justify the
extraordinary relief of a TRO or injunction. On this issue, the defendants
pointed out that no California elector had ever been prosecuted or
threatened with prosecution under § 18002,142 demonstrating the extent
to which discretionary actions by state officials implicates the operation
of binding laws. The Court also noted that Koller had said he would vote

136.
137.

Id. at 10.
Id.

138. The 2016 election in general, and the unexpectedly-widespread public calls for elector
defections against Donald Trump, should caution against unsupported assumptions about what
the public expects from the political system.

139.
140.

Thomas v. Cohen, 262 N.Y.S. 320, 326 (Sup. Ct. 1933); see Zadrozny, supra note 29.
Koller v. Brown, No. 5: 16-cv-7609, slip op. at 1-2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016).

California's Elections Code states that electors must vote for the candidate from the party they
represent, and in a separate section creates sanctions against persons "charged with the
performance of any duty under any law of this state relating to elections, who willfully neglects
or refuses to perform it." Id. at 2.

14 1.

Id. at 4, 8.

142.

Id at 11.
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for Clinton "as the California law stands now."l4 3 Judge Davila also noted
that, if Koller did cast a faithless vote and was prosecuted, he might be
able to mount a successful defense or might receive a deferred
judgment.'" All of these factors contributed to the court's finding that
the potential ensuing harm was not sufficiently immediate to entitle him
to extraordinary relief. In this way, another court avoided making a final
determination on the status of elector discretion.
The Koller litigation came to the same ultimate result as the Baca
litigation, but the courts' reasoning differed significantly, demonstrating
that this area of the law is anything but settled. The Northern District of
California credited plaintiffs' arguments based on contemporary
statements of the framers, noting that "Hamilton's statements in
Federalist 68 are informative on the meaning intended by the framers of
the Constitution in Article II § 1."45 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit held
that the intentions of the framers could only be considered if the plaintiffs
successfully argued that the plain meaning of the text was ambiguous.1 4 6
The Northern District also constructed its holding more narrowly than the
District Court of Colorado, primarily relying on the demanding standards
for a preliminary injunction rather than on broad principles about the
public's expectations of elector behavior. And the California court's
opinion lacked any of Judge Daniel's strong language against elector
discretion.
3. Chiafalo v. Inslee
The final legal challenge of the 2016 Electoral College sought relief
declaring that Washington's RCW 29A.56.340 was unconstitutional. 14 7
Although Washington's statutory penalty is a civil one and only amounts
to $1,000, plaintiffs argued that elector Levi Guerra and her family would
be unable to pay this fine were she to cast a faithless vote. 148 In Contrast
to the Northern District of California, Judge Robart found that the
plaintiffs had not shown that there were "serious questions going to the
merits" of their claims. Robart referenced the District of Colorado's
opinion in Baca, noting that Judge Daniel "denied a request to
preliminarily enjoin Colorado's law, which is considerably more coercive
than Washington's." 4 9 According to the court's interpretation,
"Washington has no law precluding Plaintiffs from voting as they
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 7.
Baca v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-1482, slip op. at 10 n.2 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016).
Chiafalo v. Inslee, No. 16-36034, slip op. at 1-2 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2016).
Chiafalo v. Inslee, No. C16-1886, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2016).

149.

Id. at 7 n.1.
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choose-and having those votes counted-in the Electoral College. The
only potential State-imposed repercussion before the court is the
discretionary civil penalty of up to $1,000.00.""so
Chiafalo appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but his appeal was rejected in
a summary order. Chiafalo was ultimately no more successful than Baca
or Koller, but the Chiafalo decision relied to a greater extent on the
relatively weak and discretionary nature of Washington's statutory
penalties. Despite three lawsuits being brought, no court reached the
merits of whether presidential electors have constitutionally-protected
discretion.
C. The ElectoralCollege Vote
In the end, the faithless electors of 2016 fell far short of unseating
Donald Trump. Four strategic faithless votes were successfully recorded,
although these electors did not ultimately agree on a compromise
candidate: Suprun followed through with his pledge, casting his vote for
John Kasich. 5 i And former Secretary of State Colin Powell, a
Republican, received three strategic faithless votes from Chiafalo, Levi
Guerra, and Esther John, all Democrats of Washington state. 5 2 Michael
Baca, of Colorado also attempted to vote for Kasich after taking an oath
to vote for Clinton.1 53 In a dramatic scene in the Colorado State House,
Secretary of State Williams told Baca: "[y]ou must vote as the Colorado
citizens vote." 5 4 Baca responded that: "[t]hreatening elections is also
against the law, Secretary Williams." 5 s Ultimately, Williams had Baca
replaced by an elector who then voted for Clinton. The three unsuccessful
plaintiffs from the Koller and Baca lawsuits did not attempt to cast
faithless votes.
In addition to these strategic faithless votes, 2016 also saw a spike in
the number of protest votes that were cast or were attempted. David
Mulinix, a Democratic elector from Hawaii, successfully voted for Bernie
Sanders rather than Hillary Clinton, 156 despite the fact that Hawaii has a
binding law on its books. Robert Satiacum, a Democratic elector from
Washington, voted for Native American rights activist Faith Spotted
Eagle instead of Clinton. Bill Greene, a Republican elector from Texas,
150.

Id. at 6.

151.

Boccagno, supra note 10.

152.

Id.

153.
DENVER

Brian Eason, Colorado's Electoral Votes go to Hillary Clinton After One is Replaced,
POST (Dec. 19, 2016), www.denverpost.com/2016/12/19/Colorado-electors-new-

motion-federal-appeal-denied/.
154. Id
155. Id
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See Boccagno, supra note 10.

236

UNIVERSITY O' FILRIDA JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 28

voted for former congressman Ron Paul instead of Donald Trump.'
David Bright of Maine and Muhammad Abdurrahman of Minnesota also
unsuccessfully attempted to cast faithless votes for Bernie Sanders. 58
Bright changed his ballot to a vote for Clinton after his vote for Sanders
was invalidated, while Abdurrahman was replaced by an elector who
voted for Clinton.' 5 9
III. A CHANGED LANDSCAPE

To appreciate the scale of the change that occurred in 2016, one need
only compare this past election to that of 2000, the last time the popularvote loser won the Electoral College. Writing a year after Bush's victory,
Ann Althouse stated that:
The most striking thing about the "breakdown" [in 2000] is that
there was no breakdown. People were outraged about the
"butterfly ballot," Vote-O-Matic punch cards, and the activities of
quite a few government institutions ... but notably not the electoral
college. There was concern about faithless electors, but the electors
all admirably stood their ground, despite the temptingly narrow
electoral vote margin of George W. Bush . . . The 2000 election
reinforces Professor Best's conclusion that the faithless elector
problem alone is too "miniscule" to have its own constitutional
amendment.1 60
Bush won 272 electoral votes in 2000, clearing the 270-vote threshold
by only two electors. In 2016, 13 electors publicly expressed a desire to
cast faithless votes. Seven successfully cast such votes, six did not. Both
the number of successful and the number of unsuccessful faithless votes
m 2016 were higher than the margin of victory five elections ago. We can
no longer dismiss the question of faithless electors-or the
constitutionality of the statutes that regulate them-as being a
"miniscule" problem. And given the widespread popular movement
calling on electors to rebel against Donald Trump, we can no longer
assume that social pressure and customary norms will continue to
dissuade would-be faithless electors.
The 2016 election revealed a new problem, above and beyond the oft157.

Id.

158.

See Detrow, supra note 12.

159.
160.

Id.
Ann Althouse, Electoral College Reform: Dja Vu, 95 Nw. U.L. REV. 993, 1011 (2001)

(citing JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF THE

ELECTORAL COLLEGE 190 (1971)).
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debated democratic legitimacy of elector discretion. Hawaii and
Colorado have facially similar binding laws. Hawaii law mandates that,
the electors "shall vote by ballot for that person for president and that
person for vice president of the United States, who are, respectively, the
. .161
candidates of the political party or group which they represent. **
Colorado law similarly requires that electors "shall vote for the
presidential candidate and . .. vice-presidential candidate who received

the highest number of votes at the preceding general election in this
state."' 62 Neither state law mandates the automatic invalidation of a
faithless vote,1 6 3 but both include a somewhat vague provision about
replacing vacant elector positions. M In a coherent system, one would
expect would-be faithless electors from Hawaii and Colorado either to
both meet with success or to both meet with failure.
David Mulinix of Hawaii flouted his state's binding law and cast a
vote for Bernie Sanders, while Michael Baca of Colorado was removed
and replaced by Colorado's Secretary of State after attempting to cast a
faithless vote. This discrepancy revealed a dangerous flaw in our
patchwork system of regulating the Electoral College: the uncertain legal
status of state binding laws allows state election officials to use their
discretion to alter election outcomes.
There is no reason to believe that the state officials in Colorado and
Hawaii acted with anything other than good faith (although Williams's
decision to remove and replace Baca appears to contradict the Tenth
Circuit's assumption that such an action would be "unlikely in light of
the text of the Twelfth Amendment."). But the discretion they had in
interpreting these vague statutes demonstrates a real risk. In a closer
election, whether a faithless vote is recorded or invalidated could easily
determine the Presidency. A partisan election official might then be
presented with the decision to vigorously enforce an ambiguous binding
law, as Colorado did, or to take a hands-off approach, as Hawaii did.
Regardless of whether one subscribes to Hamilton's vision of free
electors or Judge Daniel's view of ministerial electors, there should be
broad consensus that discretion should belong to the electors or should
not exist at all. Unfortunately, the deterrent-based statutes create a
problematic middle ground.
161.

See HAW. REV. STAT.

§

14-28 (1981).

162. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-304 (2001).
163. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 14-28 (1981); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 1-4-304 (2001).
164. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14-27 (1981) (Vacancies filled by alternates or by other electors in
"case of the death or absence of any elector chosen, or if the number of electors is deficient for
any other reason."); COLO. REV. STAT.

§

1-4-304 (2001) (Vacancies filled by other electors in case

of "death, refusal to act, absence, or other cause.") The only facial difference between the two
statutes is Colorado's inclusion of "refusal to act," but, because it is difficult to characterize a
faithless vote as a "refusal to act," it appear that Williams acted under the residual "other cause"

clause, which is mirrored in Hawaii's law.
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CONCLUSION

Plans to abolish the Electoral College have been a feature of national
debate for almost as long as the college itself has existed.1 65 John Hart
Ely saw the Electoral College as a counterexample to his belief that, apart
from the exercise of judicial review, American society has continuously
progressed toward greater majoritarian rule.1 66 Justice Jackson dissented
in Blair that the "demise of the whole electoral system would not impress
me as a disaster." 67 In 1967, the American Bar Association declared that
the Electoral College was "archaic, undemocratic, complex, ambiguous,
indirect, and dangerous."' 6 8
But the Electoral College has managed to survive this long, and it has
always had its defenders. Ross and Josephson believed that "the failed
attempts to eliminate the electoral college indicate that one or more
features of the college are still seen as worth preservin or that no
alternative is generally viewed as more advantageous."' Alexander
Bickle saw the College as being able to "satisfy, at once, the symbolic
aspirations of the small states and the present, practical needs of the large
ones."17 0 Joy McAfee wrote that, the Electoral College "is democratic,
not undemocratic . . . [and] gives the United States a President to

represent all the fifty states." 171
Accordingly, the specific question of faithless electors has
traditionally been swept up in larger debates about the Electoral College.
Advocates of reforming the College system have argued that "widespread
social turmoil, even widespread violence, could well result if an election
result was altered by faithless electors." 72 Others who see the system as
more benign have minimized the issue, asserting that the faithless elector
question is "miniscule." 1 73
What these two competing sides have in common is that both envision
a uniform and clearly establishedsystem. The 2016 election has revealed
See Althouse, supra note 160, at 996.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 6 (1980). Ely believed that judicial review
was one counter majoritarian outcome that was justified when legislatures disrupted the
165.

166.

democratic political process "either by clogging the channels of change or by acting as accessories
to majority tyranny," but he gave no such defense of the Electoral College. Id. at 103.
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that our current system lacks coherence and unity. An elector from
Minnesota, like Muhammad Abdurrahman in 2016, is prohibited by
operation of Minnesota law to vote for any candidate other than the
winner of Minnesota's election, despite the fact that the constitutionality
of that law is still unsettled. Meanwhile, an elector from Washington, like
Chiafalo, is formally constrained by operation of Washington law to vote
for the candidate who won Washington's election, but the statutory
penalty-a fine of $1,0O0-cannot effectively deter an elector who is
convinced that a different candidate should be President. In California,
an elector like Zoller is constrained by a similar legal mechanism as that
in Washington, but because the penalty against a faithless vote includes
the potential of a felony conviction rather than a civil fine, all but the most
committed would-be faithless electors in California are effectively
deterred while those in Washington are not. Finally, an elector from
Texas, like Christopher Suprun, is free to exercise his or her discretion in
the Hamiltonian model, but is also constrained from developing a group
consensus with his fellow electors by the jumble of binding laws across
the country, each operating with varying effectiveness.
This is a system where one or two random protest votes or attempts at
strategic action have the potential to throw a close election to the House
of Representatives or to turn a narrow win into a loss. 17 4 But it is not a
system where a reasoned and near-unanimous consensus that could
confer legitimacy on an alternative candidate could ever be established,
even in nightmare scenarios such as conclusive proof of election
tampering by the winning candidate's campaign or by a foreign power.
An even more insidious flaw in this system is that too many state
statutes rely on the discretion of partisan state election officials to
determine how vigorously their deterrent schemes will be enforced. As
the events in Colorado suggest, an official belonging to the party of the
presumptive President-Elect has an incentive to vigorously enforce
binding laws by requiring specific oaths and certifications, threatening
prosecutions for perjury, and interpreting statutory phrases relating to
elector vacancies and replacements as broadly as possible. A similar state
election official from the party of the defeated candidate has an incentive
to loosely enforce such statutes, allowing electors from their state to
embrace compromise candidates and persuade free electors to do so as
well.
Are there any ways forward from here? One would be the abolition of
the Electoral College, but this seems unlikely given the many past
unsuccessful attempts on this front.17 5 Another would be for state
174. For a discussion of Congress's power to count electoral votes, see Ross & Josephson,
supra note 2, at 706 ("It is not clear whether the constitutional power to count the elector votes
includes the power not to count them.").
175. Eleven states have concluded that pledging their votes through an inter-state compact
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legislatures who wish to bind their electors to move towards a uniform
elector binding statute. The better binding statutes are those, like
Michigan's, which operate automatically rather than leaving discretion to
state officials.
In future presidential contests, election lawyers must also be prepared
for litigation such as Baca, Koller, and Chiafalo. The long and frustrating
history of elector-binding litigation shows no court will be eager to make
a definitive holding on the Twelfth Amendment. But the lawsuits that
presented the issue in 2016 were flawed, allowing them to be dismissed
on procedural grounds. Koller was dismissed in part because the plaintiff
would not decisively commit to casting a faithless vote. Chiafalo was
dismissed in part because the state statute provided only a civil penalty
and did not formally prevent an elector from casting a faithless vote.
Either lawsuit would have been more likely to reach the merits and create
a precedent had it been brought by an elector in the position of
Muhammad Abdurrahman of Minnesota, who did commit to casting a
faithless vote but had his vote invalidated by operation of Minnesota law.
The constitutional fault lines that the 2016 Electoral College revealed
are serious, and the potential for increasing numbers of faithless electors
should not be overlooked until after the next election. Reform advocates
can now point to the events of 2016 to show that, far from being merely
an academic curiosity, the faithless elector issue is a real and looming
problem. More than two centuries after the ratification of the Twelfth
Amendment, it is time to adopt a uniform and coherent system for
selecting future presidents.

is a more feasible way of reforming the Electoral College than the amendment process. See CAL.
ELEC. CODE §§ 6920-21 (2012); see also Hendrik Hertzberg, NationalPopular Vote: New York
State Climbs Aboard, NEW YORKER (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/
comment/2014/04/national-popular-vote-new-york-state-climbs-aboard.html.
If enough states
were to join this compact, the president could be elected by winning the national popular vote.

Although this compact might be simpler than abolishing the Electoral College, the question of
whether state electors would be bound to follow the compact would remain.

